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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. J. :MAYHEW, 
Plaintvff -Respovndent, 
vs. 
STANDARD GILSONITE COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLAN·T'S BRIEF 
Case 
No.134849 
STATEMENT OF T·HE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to set aside a default judgment 
rendered against the appellant and based upon an action 
by the plaintiff respondent alleging that the contract 
is void, illegal and unenforceable. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted a default judgment on 
February 23rd, 1962, and on that same day, the defend-
ant appellant filed a motion to set aside the default judg-
ment. Said motion was properly supported by evidence, 
which motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks vacation of the judgment, and 
judgment remanding the case back to the District Court 
for trial on its merHs. 
S'TATE~IENT OF FACTS 
A complaint was filed by the plaintiff on January 
30th, 1962, alleging that a contract entered into by and 
between the plaintiff and defendant July 2nd, 1958, was 
illegal, void and unenforceable, and therefore the de-
fendant should return to the plaintiff patent rights which 
had been assigned by virtue of the July 2nd, 1958 con-
tract, and should he enjoined fron1 further using the 
patent in the operation of defendant's business. As a 
second cause of action that the contract in question was 
alleged to have been breached. 
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The contract of July 2nd, 1958 was attached and made 
a part of the plaintiff's complaint. The contract was 
prepared in part at least, by plaintiff's attorneys and 
certainly with their approval, as within the document 
itself Plaintiff's attorney is specifically named. Under 
the terms of the contract in question the plaintiff received 
10,000 shares in Standard Gilsonite Company stock valued 
at $2.00 per share, $15,000.00 cash, and royalties in the 
sum of $19,000.00. Although the contract is alleged to be 
void and unenforceable, the plaintiff has not tendered or 
offered to return the benefits received under the contract. 
On January 18th, 1962, R. J. Pinder, President of 
Standard Gilsonite Company resigned as President of 
the corporation by sending formal notices to the existing 
director, officer, and substantial stockholdeTs. There-
after on February 1st, 1962, a Mr. B. F. Romono per-
sonally served R. J. Pinder as officer and President of 
the corporation, although at the time of service R. J. 
Pinder clearly informed Romono that he was no longer 
President, or associated with the corporation. At this 
time the corporation was without formal management 
or authorized leadership whatsoever, and the 3,000 share-
holders, most of whom lived out of the State of Utah, 
were at the mercy of the Plaintiff seeking to enforce his 
claims against the corporation. On February 16th, 1962, 
the firm of Jensen, Jensen & Bradford was contacted by 
a group of interested stockholders in order to determine 
what could be done to protect the corporation, pending 
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reorganization. Said counsel attempted to contact R. J. 
Pinder and obtain the necessary information with which 
to protect the corporation against the complaint herein 
involved. That on the 16th day of February, 1962, R. J. 
Pinder, in the presence of attorney William Bradford, 
contacted by long distance telephone certain shareholders 
of the defendant corporation, for the purpose of establish-
ing Jensen, Jensen & Bradford's authority to properly 
represent the defendant corp.oration in the action. Be-
cause of the delay in getting the necessary information 
from the stockholders in distant parts of the United 
States, it was not until February 23rd, 1962 that the neces-
sary information, documents, and authority to actively 
enter the law suit were available to the legal counsel. 
On February 23rd, 1962, a judgment and decree was 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court against the 
defendant. On February 23rd, 1962, the same date on 
which the judgment vvas entered, Jensen, Jensen & Brad-
ford called and as:ked respondent counsel for a chance to 
plead, and was denied this, and advised that the default 
judgment had been entered a few hours earlier. Immedi-
ately Jensen, Jensen & Bradford filed with the Clerk of 
the District Court a n1otion and notice that the default 
judgment theretofore entered upon that date, be set 
aside. The 1notion was supported b~T an affidavit properly 
executed by R. J. Pinder, and a n1esne assignment by 
which patent rights clailned by the plaintiff were assigned 
to Halliburton Company by the defendant. On March 7th, 
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1962, at 2 :30 p.m., the motion was heard. However, it was 
continued until March 14th, 1962, at which time, despite 
the fact that it was not only apparent that there were 
meritorious defenses, but there was also a serious ques-
tion as to jurisdiction having been obtained over the de-
fendant corporation, the Court denied the defendant's 
motion to set aside the judgment. However, it should 
be noted that the Court itself comments, at page 16 in 
the transcript of Beaver Dam Sales vs. Standa;r.d Gilson-
ite, a con1panion case, also on appeal at this time, that 
the case should (emphasis added) be placed on the trial 
calendar. 
A substantially identical case involving the same 
primary parties is now before this Court, entitled Beaver 
Dam Sale.s Company v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 
and it would he well to examine the transcript in that 
case, because it involves substantially the same testimony 
and is based upon the same affidavits and proof as the 
instant case and was treated in conjunction with this in-
stant case by the lower court, and should be so treated 
now. 
STATEl\fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS IN 
ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT SETTING ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDIGTION IN THAT 
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SERVED. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT BASED UPON FINDINGS OF AN ILLEGAL 
CONTRACT, PREPARED BY THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF, 
WITH MUTUAL PARTICIPATION, AND STILL ALLOWING 
HIM TO R.ETAIN $54,000.00 IN PROFIT, AND GRANTING 
JUDGMENT WHICH RETURNED THE PA'T'ENTS WHICH 
WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL CON-
TRACT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS IN 
ERROR AS A MAT'TER OF LAW IN NOT SETTING ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
By the rules in this State, the attitude and policy 
relative to the setting aside of a default judgment are 
codified with the purpose in mind of guiding the trial 
court in the use of its discretion. Quoting in part the 
phrases from Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
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"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect ... '' (Emphasis added.) 
Considerable importance should be attached to the 
words ''excusable neglect." The definition given to the 
word ''neglect'' in vVebster's Collegiate Dictionary, 5th 
Edition, is "to omit to notice, to be remiss in attending 
to, or fail to do, care for." This fairly contemplates that 
that which has been done, or not done, as in the instant 
case, is remiss to one's responsibilities, but in the interest 
of justice and fairness, the law deems it fair to excuse 
neglect or failures which are not unreasonably gross. 
It is further implied and made factual by the adop-
tion of the Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the functions 
of which was to remove many of the technical difficulties 
involved in pleading, and to avoid the inequities resulting 
frmn a failure to properly adhere to the rather stringent 
rules of code pleading, by which, in years gone by, many 
law suits were won and lost. 
The law in Utah, by the statutes, by the rules, and 
by the cases, clearly leans toward the equitable position 
and attitude that a case should be heard on its merits. 
Our Supreme Court in Bylund 'V. Crook et al., 208 P. 504, 
states at page 505: 
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''Our trial courts are usually very liberal in 
vacating and setting aside default judgments en-
tered against a defaulting party by reason of mis-
take, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or in case 
.where there has been fraud or deceit practiced. 
Under our practice it is generally regarded as an 
abuse of discretion for a trial court not to vacate 
and set aside a default judgment when there is 
any reasonable gro?.tnds for doing so, and timely 
appl~cation is made." (Emphasis added.) 
This statement expresses the policies enumerated 
above, and the basic policy of our Supreme Court in deal-
ing with the setting aside of default judgments. In the 
case with which we are here concerned, certainly no rea-
sonable person could contend that timely application was 
not made for the setting aside of the default judgment. 
The necessary motion and supporting affidavit, together 
"\Yith additional documents, were filed on the same date 
that the default judgment was entered. 
Certainly it is recognized that the moving party 
should he diligent and show that he was prevented from 
avoiding the default judgment because of circumstances 
over which he had no control. In this regard, the Court 
states in TVat-ren v. D.ixon Ra'Jl.ch Company et al., 260 P. 
2d. 7+1, at page7-t~: 
''Discretion must be exercised in furtherance 
of justice and the court will incline toward grant-
ing relief in a doubtful case to ~he end that a party 
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rnay have a hearing: Hurd v. Hurd, 74 Utah 46, 
276 Pac. 908. However, the movant must show 
that he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control. Peterson v. Crozier, 29 
Utah 235, 81 P. 860." 
The use of the term ''no control" in the foregoing 
case, certainly when alined with the phrase "excusable 
neglect" fairly implies that the term ''circumstances over 
which he had no control" does not mean that the only 
thing that will constitute circumstances over which he has 
no control would be an act of God, or the term "excusable 
neglect" would be meaninglness. It is apparent, in the 
instant case, that trial counsel was diligent in attempting 
to protect the interest of his client, the defendant-
appellant herein. As mentioned in the affidavit which is 
a part of this record, in paragraph 4 defense counsel in-
dicates that he was unable to obtain readily information 
relative to the position of the defendant in this law suit 
until February 16th, 1962. Immediately thereafter he 
attempted to contact R. J. Pinder, the former President. 
After finally getting him into the office, long-distance 
telephone calls were made in order to get the necessary 
documents, papers and information with which to proper-
ly represent the defendant. On the 23rd day of Febru-
ary, 1962, the default judgment was entered. The defense 
counsel called plaintiff's counsel to request an opportun-
ity for smne additional time in which to responsively 
plead, and was advised that a default judgment had been 
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entered hours prior, and immediately counsel for the ap-
pellant filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It is 
certainly not a situation where counsel should be con-
demned for not taking what is customary action, which is, 
inviolation of rules and attitudes of the Court of this state 
and others, of filing a general denial of the allegations of 
plaintiff's complaint in order to stall, giving him suffi-
cient opportunity to obtain the facts. Rather, defense 
counsel endeavored to bring before the Court a legitimate 
defense but Vi/as delayed in obtaining the same. 
It is to be borne in mind, and certainly brought to 
the attention of the Court and to plaintiff-respondent's 
counsel, that there were no officers or directors legally 
qualified in the State of Utah, and that of the approxi-
Inately 3,000 shareholders nearly all of them resided 
outside of the State of Utah. There was no active man-
agement. There was no one ''rith responsibility to give 
orders, and there was no one to whom legal counsel 
could turn when decisions had to he made relative to an-
swering and responding in litigation, and no readily avail-
able source frorn which the infonnation could be obtained 
to present a meritorious defense. 
By the time a reorganization con1mittee was formed 
by a group of stockholders to protect the defendant cor-
poration, the default had been entered. Certainly, circum-
stances of the kind herein alleged were considered when 
Rule 60 (b) was drafted. Therefore, the Supre1ne Court 
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in the instant case, should find that Rule 60(b) is appli-
cable in both sub paragraphs 1 and 7, and that in either 
case the trial court, in the equitable and fair use of its 
discretion, should have granted the motion for the setting 
aside of the default judgment. 
In the case of Cutler v. Haycock, 90 P. 897, a case 
somewhat similar was appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court. In this particular case the plaintiff filed a com-
plaint in an action of replivin. The twenty days for an-
swering expired on December 1st, 1905. On December 1st, 
the defendant's attorney mailed a demurrer. The demur-
rer did not arrive until December 4th because of the slow 
mailing services in the southern part of Utah. On De-
cember 2nd the plaintiff's attorney entered a default 
judgment. Prior to the entering of the default judgment, 
the defendant himself asked the plaintiff's attorney not 
to enter a default judgment because his attorney was 
preparing the necessary papers and would send him 
copies. However, the default was entered. Subsequently, 
the defaulted defendant's attorney filed a motion to va-
cate the default judgment. The Court stated at page 900: 
"As has been well said in all doubtful cases 
the general rule of courts is to incline towards 
granting relief from the default and to bring about 
a judgment on the merits." 
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Continuing on, the Court said at page 900: 
"This rule, as appears from the authorities, is 
of ahnost universal application, and is defeated 
only in eases where the default is the result of in-
excusable neglect of the party in default, or where 
it would be inequitable to set it aside." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Court then went on to state that the trial court had 
abused its discretion in not setting aside the default be-
cause of the following reasons: 
1. The appellant had made reasonable efforts to 
comply with the law. (Emphasis added.) 
2. ~The case arose in a sparcely settled country 
where communications were slo·w. (Note: Even if fast, 
would have arrived a day, or at least hours late.) 
3. Good faith and reasonable effort to make a de-
fense are always elen1ents to be considered in each case. 
4. There is not the slightest intimation that the 
respondent would have suffered either inconvenience or 
loss of any kind by setting aside default. 
5. This was not a case where a party at great ex-
pense and saerifice of time had prepared for trial and 
would be compelled to undergo it all again if the other 
party is pennitted to defend. 
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6. It is not a case where any evidence has been lost 
to the prevailing party. 
Answering point by point the foregoing issues made 
in the case of Ctdler v. Haycock and applying the·m to the 
instant case: 
1. ·The diligence and reasonable efforts to comply 
with the law are apparent. 
2. Although the case· did not take place in a sparcely 
settled country all of the truly interested parties of the 
defendant were over a thousand miles away and many 
miles apart in distant areas of the United States. 
3. Good faith and reasonable efforts to make a de-
fense are present and will be set forth in some detail in 
the second and third arguments of this brief. 
4. There is no allegation or intimation that the re-
spondent will suffer great inconvenience or loss by set-
ting aside the default judgment. 
5. There has been no showing that the plaintiff 
has gone to any considerable expense or sacrifice in 
preparing for trial. 
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6. 1There is no indication that by having a trial at a 
date subsequent to February 23rd evidence will be lost. 
In truth and fact the evidence is largely documentary 
and can be entered in evidence at any time. All of the 
material witnesses to the case are largely available in 
Utah and will be none the less available if this case is 
heard on its merits than they were at the time the default 
judgment was entered. 
Quoting again from Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
60 (h): 
". . . the motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and 
(4), not more than three n1onths after the judg-
ment, orde-r or proceeding \Yas entered or taken." 
Sub paragraph 7 states: ''the motion shall be made -w-ith-
in a reasonable time" and does not lin1it it to any par-
ticular number of days. 
Again, it is important to recognize that the defendant 
could not have acted more timely in response to his 
default position, for if he had been only several hours 
earlier the case would not be before this Court. 
In the case of Ney v. Harrison, 5 Ut. 2d 217, 299 P. 
2d, 1114, the Court said: 
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"The statutory authority of trial courts to set 
aside judgments obtained by default has been lib-
erally construed to the end that there be trial on 
the merits, beginning with our earliest decisions. 
In the recent case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
we had occasion to review the policy considera-
tions and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal con-
struction, thus : 
''The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforc£ng a judgment, which may oc-
cur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs 
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which pre-
vent the presentation of a claim or defense."' 
(Emphasis added.) 
One of the factors considered by the Court in deter-
mining whether a default judgment should be set aside 
is whether there is a material issue or a defense to the 
complaint. In the instant case the affidavit attached to 
the motion to set aside the judgment by default specific-
ally enumerates in paragraphs 5 through 14 inclusive, 
the defenses which could be raised upon trial. The Court 
in Utah Commercial and Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 
1033, stated at page 1036: 
"This raises a n1aterial issue, and if true, will 
make a good defense. Conspiracy and collusion of 
the bank officials with the mortgagors are also set 
up with considerable detail. The defense indicated 
is clearly meritorious, and, with a record replete 
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with circumstances indicating that the purpose 
and intention was to defend the action on its 
merits, would it be reasonable or justifiable to in-
fer that the defendant knowingly and intentionally 
neglected his case~" 
In the matter at hand, it is absurd to assume that the 
defendant, having allegedly given $20,000.00 in stoctk to 
the plaintiff-respondent, and approximately $34,000.00 
in cash, desires to sit back and idly allow a judgment to be 
entered whereby patent positions and contracts quite nec-
essary for their operation will be taken from them. Espe-
cially should this be considered in light of the fact that 
two royalty payments were forwarded to the plaintiff-
respondent before notice of termination was mailed to the 
plaintiff by the defendant. These checks were returned. 
Continuing on with the case of J..T ey v. Rarr:VSon, the 
Court at page 1036 states: 
"Such is not the law, and courts do not favor 
judgments by default. The policy of the law is that 
every man shall have his day in court before the 
judgment shall be entered against him, and where 
a judg1nent by default has been entered, and with-
in the proper ti1ne a good defense to the action 
in which the judg1nent is rendered, is made to ap-
pear, and it is shown that the default "·as entered 
through exmtsable neglect or n1istake, the default 
will be vacated and the judg1nent set aside, to per-
mit a trial on the 1nerits." (Emphasis added.) 
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"'The power of the court to set aside the judg-
ments by default is recognized and conferred in 
Section 3005, Rev. St. 1898, and should be liberally 
exercised for the purpose of directing proceedings 
. . . and where the circmnstances which led to de-
fault are such as to cause the court to hesitate, it 
is better to resolve the doubt in favor of the appli-
cation, so that a trial may be secured on the 
merits." 
It cannot be said that the Court did not hesitate in 
the case at bar, for as indicated in the Statement of Facts, 
the Court in addressing its remarks to the parties, ex-
pressly stated, clearly evidencing its hesitation, that this 
case should he placed on the trial calendar. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THAT 
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SERVED. 
Under Rule 4 (e) 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the manner of service on a corporation is express-
ly outlined. It is to he served by the delivering of a copy 
of the smnmons and complaint to an officer, a managing 
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by ap-
pointment or by law to receive service of process. 
The plaintiff in attepting to secure service upon 
Standard Gilsonite Company served R. J. Pinder as an 
officer. R. J. Pinder, upon receiving the smnmons and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
complaint, categorically stated that he was not an offi-
cer, and that he was not employed by Standard Gilsonite. 
The process servicer, however, under apparent instruc-
tions, served him, despite the advice that he was not an 
officer, director or employee. Documentary evidence and 
testimony as set forth in the affidavit of R. J. Pinder and 
attached to the motion to set aside the default judgment, 
clearly states that on January 18th, 1962, R. J. Pinder 
resigned as an officer and director of Standard Gilsonite 
Company. The service of summons was not made until 
February 1st, 1962. Certainly, it cannot be contended, 
under the circumstances here involved, that the service 
of summons and complaint is in valid and proper form. 
It would appear that there is no alternative but to insist 
that the service was of no legal effect and that jurisdic-
tion was not obtained over Standard Gilsonite Company, 
for there is no evidence of any nature whatsoever in any 
of the pleadings, to indicate that R. J. Pinder was in fact 
an officer at the time of the filing of the complaint and 
service of the summons. He was served, but he denies 
being an officer or director, and judgment is taken 
against Standard Gilsonite. At least, it would seem that 
there is an issue which should be resolved concerning the 
question of whether or not he was an officer at the time 
of service, and the the trial court should allow the intro-
duction of evidence to disprove the affidavit of Mr. 
Pinder, rather than to summarily grant a default judg-
ment, and a fortiori, in denying the n1otion for setting 
aside, even on the basis of Rule 4 (e) 4 or Rule 60 (b), 
sub section 4. 
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The trial court commented in the Beaver Dam Sales 
Company v. Standard Gilsonite Company transcript, the 
con1panion case to the one here in issue, to the fact that 
there was a question in mind of whether the officer, 
when he resigned, must notify third parties. The law 
on this particular point is clear. At 13 Am. Jur. Sec. 883 
at page 867, the law is set forth as follows: 
"An officer of a corporation may terminate 
his office by resignation if the statutes, charter, 
and by-laws impose no limitations thereon, and in 
doing so, he need not give any notice to the public 
or to persons dealing with the corporation. The 
fact that a statute requires directors, unless re-
moved, to continue in office until their successors 
are appointed does not prevent a director from 
resigning at any time. The right of an officer to 
resign as regards third persons, however, is not 
unqualified, and as against them the motive of a 
resignation may render it ineffectual.'' 
There is not one scintilla of evidence in this file that 
R. J. Pinder had any ulterior motive for resigning as an 
officer and director of Standard Gilsonite Company, par-
ticularly as it relates to the case at hand. There is no 
testimony or evidence that R. J. Pinder's resignation was 
in any way motivated by any other desire than to simply 
get out of Standard Gilsonite, which is at present an 
insolvent corporation proceeding under the provisions 
of Chapter XI of the Chandler Act. Even if there should 
have been testimony or evidence to the effect that Pinder 
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had indeed an ulterior motive in resigning as an officer 
and director of Standard Gilsonite, this would be a ques-
tion of fact for the court or jury to decide on the basis of 
evidence presented before it, and therefore would he an-
other issue to place before the court, and another reason 
why this case should not have been defaulted. Certainly 
with the record before the court it is apparent that juris-
diction, on the basis of the evidence presented to the 
court, had not been obtained over the defendant, and the 
court was in error in assuming that under the law, notice 
of resignation of an officer and director must be given 
to third parties. Acting under misinterpretation and 
perhaps misunderstanding of the general rule of law, the 
court heard and denied the motion to set aside the default 
judgment. 
The resignation generally becomes immediately ef-
feetive, unless some provision in the resignation provides 
otherwise. Again quoting from 13 Am. J ur. 886 at page 
868, it states: 
"According to son1e authorities, a resignation 
by an officer of a corporation takes effect immedi-
ately and is not dependent upon the appointment 
of a successor in office, even though a by-law pro-
vides that the office shall be held until a successor 
is appointed. There are authorities, however, 
which have taken the view that where the by-laws 
provide that a corporate officer shall continue to 
hold office until the election of his successor, the 
resignation of suc.h an officer does not take effect 
until then.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
In this particular case, the counsel for the appellant 
stipulates that the corporate charter and by-laws pro-
vide that an officer shall hold office until a successor is 
appointed, but does not provide anything concerning res-
ignations. 
There IS evidence that R.J. Pinder's status as an 
officer and director prior to his resignation is perhaps 
questionable. If, however, the court ta:kes the position 
of accepting the general rule of law, Mr. Pinder's resigna-
tion was effective and the service occurred at a time sub-
sequent to his resignation. Again quoting from 13 Am. 
Jur., Sec. 885, at page 868: 
"Since an officer may resign, as a rule, at 
pleasure, no action on the part of the corporation 
is essential to 1nake his resignation effectual. Ac-
ceptance thereof by the directors or governing 
body is not required. "\Vhen he tenders his resigna-
tion to the proper corporate authorities, to take 
effect immediately, the resignation is con1plete, al-
though it is not acted on by the corporation or 
entered in its books." 
In the instant case the letter of resignation was for-
warded to all the responsible parties, primarily certain 
majority stockholders and the one remaining director, 
and all, in fact, who held responsible positions in this 
corporation, were notified. Under these circumstances, it 
would appear that no one can contend that as a matter 
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of law the resignation was ineffective. To allow the 
default judgment to stand where there is a serious ques-
tion as to the court having obtained jurisdiction would be 
a great injustice. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT BASED UPON FINDINGS OF AN ILLEGAL 
CONTRACT, PREPARED BY THE PLAI~TIFF HIMSELF, 
WITH MUTUAL PARTICIPATION, AND STILL ALLOWING 
HIM ·TO RETAIN $54,000.00 IN PROFIT, AND GRANTING 
JUDGMENT WHICH RE'TURNED THE PATENTS WHICH 
WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL CON-
TRACT. 
The lower court erred in granting a default judgment 
based upon a complaint which expressly alleges that the 
action is based upon an illegal con tract, said contract be-
ing prepared with the consent and approval of plaintiff's 
own counsel, who is, in fact, named in the agreement, 
under the terms of which, over a period of approximately 
four years, the plaintiff received in excess of $50,000.00, 
and further the court erred in granting injunctive relief 
in instructing the defendant to transfer back to the plain-
tiff the subject of an illegal contract. 
Referring to the judgment and decree entered in this 
case, paragraph 2 states : 
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"The contract entered into between the plain-
tiff and defendant dated July 2nd, 1958, is illegal, 
void and uninforceable." 
On the basis of the finding of the contract to be void 
and illegal, it is seemingly elementary law stated in the 
Latin maxim ex dodo malo non oritur actio, which, freely 
translated, means "no court will lend its aid to a man who 
found his claim of action upon an immoral or illegal 
act." 
Quoting from 12 Am. Jur. on Contracts at Sec. 209, 
at page 713: 
"In other words no action can be based upon 
an illegal agreement. The rule rests upon the 
broad ground that no court will allow itself to be 
used when its judgment will consumate an act 
forbidden by law. It has its foundation in the 
policy of discouraging illegal and corrupt agree-
ments by refusing all judicial aid to the parties 
to them. This rule applies to any agreement which 
is illegal. . . ." 
Generally, limitations on enforcement of rights grow-
ing out of legal agreements are applied in cases where 
parties are in pari delicto. It should be noted that this 
contract has persisted since 1958 and certainly if the con-
tract were illegal, the plaintiff knew, or should have 
known, of its character. The contract on its face shows 
no apparent illegality, no illegal object is known, and 
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certainly illegality cannot be presumed or inferred. If 
illegal, the plaintiff during the period of time accepted 
the rather substantial benefits thereunder, alleged to be 
in ,excess of $50,000.00, and cannot reasonably contend 
at this point that he is not in pari delicto, and cer-
tainly no evidence was presented to the lower court ne-
gating or even alleging that they were not. 
It is entirely possible, and only sufficient evidence 
will prove, that only the plaintiff who asserts illegality 
had :knowledge of the purported illegality and under these 
circumstances it is elementary that the courts have a duty 
to protect the innocent party and, if necessary, to penalize 
the party guilty of attempting to accomplish an illegal 
objective by entirely legal means. 
Certainly if the courts did not punish the guilty party 
they would at least require the restitution of the monies 
paid. 
12 Am. Jur. Sec. 213 states at page 72-±: 
"It is son1etimes said that a party to an illegal 
agreement will not be pern1itted to avail hin1self 
of its illegality until he restores to the other party 
all that has been received fron1 such party on the 
illegal agreement, and that so long as he continues 
to enjoy the bene,fits of the agree1nent, he will not 
be allowed to set up its nullity." 
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Concluding this aspect of the argun1ent, if it can be 
shown that the defendant had no knowledge of the illegal 
objective or the illegality of the contract, such sums as 
those received by the plaintiff herein, with the (knowledge 
of illegality, should be returned to the defendant herein 
prior to the maintaining of an action upon an alleged 
illegal contract. If, on the other hand, the parties are in 
pari ,delicto, the court should refuse to give any aid or 
comfort to either party and accordingly deny any action. 
In this case, however, the court granted injunctive relief, 
together with an order to the defendant to transfer the 
subject of the contract, and a money judgment for costs, 
based upon an illegal contract. 
It should be noted, however, and perhaps made the 
subject of an independent argument, that the judgment 
and degree is cornpletely at odds with any rule of law in 
that it on one hand finds the contract void and declare it 
as such in pargaraph 2, and in paragraph 4 indicates that 
if it is not void then it is terminated because of de-
faults of the defendant. These two provisions cannot 
stand together. If a contract is void it cannot be termin-
ated, it cannot be defaulted, if it never existed, and ac-
cordingly that judgment and decree is erroneous on its 
face. 
Quoting from Willian1 L. Clark, Jr., in his Handbook 
on the Law of Contracts, \Vest Publishing Co., 1931, the 
basic rule of law is cited in this general principle: 
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"To result in a contract, an agreement must 
create an obligation; and it does not create an 
obligation if it is such that the courts cannot en-
force it. An agreement, therefore, which is illegal 
or unlawful, is, in fact, no contract at all though 
it is often spoken of as an illegal contract." 
Without burdening the court with details regarding 
what constitutes an illegal contract, it is clear from the 
law that what constitutes an illegal contract is very limit-
ed in scope. There is some general allegation in the plain-
tiff's complaint that interstate commerce is involved with-
out any express allegation of why, or why its involvement 
with interstate commerce renders it illegal. Counsel 
herein submits that there is very little done in business 
affairs that does not in some way involve interstate com-
merce. No hint, therefore, can be drawn from its plead-
ing establishing anything illegal. 
See 12 Am. J ur., Sec. 150 at page 643, which states: 
"The illegality of an agree1nent may be in the 
consideration, in a pron1ise, or in its perfonnance. 
An agreement to do an illegal act is illegal. Usu-
ally the element that destroys the validity of an 
agreen1ent is the purpose of the parties to accom-
plish or to aid an unlawful object. An agreement 
which discloses an intention to contravene a stat-
ute in fraud of the public or to the injury of 
private parties savors of a conspiracy and its 
vicious and unenforceable. If such an intention 
is once found to exist, the law cannot presun1e that 
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the agreement is without the effect intended by the 
parties in order to confer upon it the quality of 
enforceability. 
"It is sometimes stated that the lawfulness of 
an agreement is to be measured by what is in-
tended.'' 
The general law being outlined as heretofore, we now 
address ourselves to cases in jurisdictions called 
upon to decide the issue as it relates to the sufject of 
illegality. 
In the case of Smith et al. v. California Thorn Cord-
age, 18 P.2d 393, at page 396, citing Domenvgoni v. hn-
perial Live Stock, 189 Cal. 467, 209 P. 36 to 39, the court 
said: 
"But it does not follow that the plaintiff was 
entitled to any relief. The entire transaction was 
an attempt to circumvent the law ... In such a case 
the court will give no relief even if the point is not 
raised by either party." 
and thereafter in the case is a rather thorough analysis 
of this subject. Quoting from paragraph 4 of that case 
at 396, the court said: 
"lTnder the foregoing authorities, where the 
parties to an illegal con tract are in pari delicto, 
the courts will not, on the one hand, undo what 
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has been done, nor on the other, perfect what has 
been left unfinished.'' 
Quoting again and focusing upon the fact that the 
foregoing case raise·s the problem with which the court 
is herein concerned, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of that case, 
the court said: 
"It may be true that the defendant, John C. 
Thorn, is not seeking relief under the terms of 
the contract. What he is trying to do is to restore 
his own status quo by taking from the other par-
ties property which he had transferred under an 
illegal agreement, pursuant to its terms and con-
ditions, something which, in this particular action, 
is not wholly inequitable, but contrary to the ex-
press policy of the law." 
It is the contention of the defendant appellant that 
there were and are substantial defenses to this action 
whether upon the basis of breach of contract or more par-
ticularly upon the basis of illegality, and it is contended 
by the defendant that the purpose for the effort on the 
part of the plaintiff to terminate the rights under the con-
tract is as a result of dealing ,,-ith a n1ajor company 
and negotiating the sale of the rights held by the defend-
ant to that cmnpany. The defendant is prepared to sub-
mit at trial a letter written to the plaintiff, l\1r. ~Iayhew, 
on June 23rd, 1961, frmn the attorney representing a sub-
stantial cmnpany, which letter states: 
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''To carry out this purpose, I have prepared 
and enclosed two copies of an agreement for your 
review. Both copies have been executed by the 
proper officers of * * * Company and if acceptable 
to you, will you please execute both copies and re-
turn one copy to me. Basically, the agreement 
provides for you to grant *** an exclusive license 
in the e'vent, and only in the event, that Standard 
(the defendant herein) should default under its 
agreement of July 2, 1958, with you provided as a 
result of such default you demand and obtain re-
assignment of the intention and the reassignment 
document being held in escrow by the Security 
Title Company of Salt La.ke City, Utah.'' 
Correspondence of the kind quoted certainly evi-
dences no illegality whatever but points up the obvious 
efforts on the part of E. J. l\fayhew to negotiate a sale of 
the rights which had been sold to Standard and had to be 
retrieved in order to consumate the subsequent sale. Both 
Mayhew and the corporation by whom the letter quoted 
was written held contractual relations with Standard in-
volving the alleged illegal contract. The agreement is 
acknowledged in the letter by the company. It is contended 
that the position to be negotiated to the company who 
wrote the letter is substantially the same position as that 
which was sold to Standard, which would imply that the 
illegality of the arrangement in question is not such that 
:Jf r. :Mayhew is not willing to sell it again. This letter 
was written months prior to the filing of the action on 
the contract to terminate the rights of Standard. 
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From the foregoing arguments as a matter of law, 
the Trial Court erred in granting relief to the plaintiff. 
The findings of fact and judgment are stated in the alter-
native in declaring the contract void and also declaring it 
breached. It cannot he both. Further, in the granting of 
the judgment on a contract alleged to be illegal which 
gives injunctive relief. The contract under which the 
plaintiff asserts his rights and cause of action by his own 
allegations is adjudged illegal and he has received under 
the terms of that contract and retained the same, the sum 
of $54,000 in benefits, then asks the court to cancel 
the contract allowing him to retain the benefits and re-
trieved the subject of his illegal bargain. 
Defendant for its stockholders petitioned the court 
for an opportunity to be heard and it was denied. It is the 
contention of the appellant herein that it is entitled to its 
day in court on any one of the three points of this argu-
ment. 
CONCL,USION 
In conclusion it is submitted: 
1. That the Trial Court has obviously abused its 
discretion in not granting the defendant's motion to set 
aside the plaintiff's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and default judgment, because the defendant en-
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deavored, with reasonable diligence after being guilty of 
excusable neglect, in filing their motion to set aside the 
default judgment, and at that time disclosing by affi-
davit numerous meritorious defenses. 
2. That the court never obtained jurisdiction over 
the defendant corporation. There are disputed facts in 
the record that no officer or authorized agent was served 
as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
that the court was mistaken in its understanding of the 
effectiveness of the resignation in question, and further 
that the plaintiff could properly have served the Seere-
tary of State in accordance with the rules, it being ap-
parent that there was no one upon whom service could 
properly be made. 
3. That the judgment here involved is inconsistent 
on its face and is based upon a contract which the plain-
tiff alleges as being illegal. If the contract is illegal as 
alleged, the court under la''T cannot give aid, comfort 
or assistance to a party who bases an action upon an 
illegal eontract. There is no testimony in the record to 
indicate that there is anything particularly invalid, il-
legal or against public policy in this contract. If it were 
illegal, then the court should have refused to hear the 
case, or in any event, have given no relief whatever. That 
deciding the issue of legality or illegality, and the finding 
that a party not allowed to be heard is guilty of an il-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
legal agreement, is to conclude that one is guilty of a 
crime without evidence and then denying him the oppor-
tunity to be heard. 
4. That upon equity, reason, logic and good con-
science, the appellant herein should prevail under these 
facts, and that such a result is supported by the weight 
of authority and the cases. 
5. 1That the plaintiff by alleging illegality and stat-
ing that the contract was void from the beginning, is now 
retaining under the terms of the purported void contract, 
the sum of $54,000.00 in cash or its equivalent, and cer-
tainly at the very least, he should be obliged to tender 
back that which he has received under a void contract, 
if it is illegal, and the defendant not in pari delicto. 
6. The trial court erred in entering its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and judgment in favor of the 
respondent, and by denying the defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
Let it therefore follow that the judgment should be 
reversed and the matter re1nanded to the District Court 
for a trial on its merits. 
Respectfully subn1i tted, 
BRUCE E. COKE 
Counsel for Defendant Appellant 
513 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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